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Abstract 
A statistical methodology is developed by which realised outcomes can be used to identify, 
for calendar years between 1974 and 2012, when policymakers in ‘advanced’ economies 
have successfully pursued single objectives of different kinds, or multiple objectives. A 
simple criterion is then used to distinguish between multiple objectives pure and simple and 
multiple objectives subject to a price stability constraint. The overall and individual country 
results which this methodology produces seem broadly plausible. Unconditional and 
conditional analyses of the inflation and growth associated with different types of objectives 
reveal that multiple objectives subject to a price stability constraint are associated with 
roughly as good economic performance as the single objective of inflation. A proposal is then 
made as to how the remit of an inflation-targeting central bank could be adjusted to allow it 
to pursue other objectives in extremis without losing the credibility effects associated with 
inflation targeting. 
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1  Introduction 
In the theory of economic policy it has long been customary to contrast the Tinbergen 
principle and the Theil approach (see, for example, Shaw, 1977). According to the former, if 
a policymaker has n objectives then he or she typically needs n instruments in order to be 
able to attain all the targets. In the monetary policy context inflation targeting, with a single 
instrument, the interest rate, deployed to hit a single target, for inflation, has been seen as the 
solution to the assignment problem (e.g. Allsopp 2010), and the Tinbergen principle has been 
presented as a key argument against ‘leaning against the wind’, that is against the proposal 
for monetary policy to respond to asset prices as well as to inflation put forward by Cecchetti 
et al. (2000, 2002). Under the Theil approach, on the other hand, the policymaker is accepted 
to have more objectives than instruments, and has to decide how to deploy his or her 
instruments in order to achieve the preferred trade-off between the objectives.  
 
It can be argued that the period for which single-instrument, single-objective, inflation 
targeting was apparently appropriate – the Great Moderation – was in fact an unusual (and 
misleading) interlude, and that the norm is a state of the world in which monetary 
policymakers have to consider multiple objectives and are not able to forecast all major 
shocks (e.g. Cobham, 2012). This suggests that it would be useful to analyse empirically the 
extent to which policymakers have in fact pursued multiple objectives. This is done here first 
by identifying what variable, if any, has been held stable within narrower margins than any 
other; when some variable has been stabilised in that way we regard it as the result of the de 
facto pursuit of a single objective of that type. When no single variable has been stabilised in 
this way policy is characterised as having had de facto multiple objectives: it is assumed that 
the policymaker always could, if they cared only about one variable (and therefore ignored 
the costs associated with developments in any other variables), stabilise that variable, so that 
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if they have not done so then they must be implicitly pursuing (trading off between) multiple 
objectives. The economic performance under different de facto objectives, in terms of 
inflation and growth,  can then  be evaluated and it turns out that performance under multiple 
objectives has in many cases been satisfactory. This suggests that the pursuit of multiple 
objectives, for example inflation targeting together with ‘leaning against the wind’, should be 
more actively considered. Over recent decades there has been a widespread move towards 
increased central bank independence with the central bank having an explicit remit set in 
most but not all cases by its government. The paper therefore proceeds to consider how 
multiple objectives could best be handled within such a modern monetary policy framework 
which incorporates accountability and transparency as part of a strategy for controlling 
inflation expectations and inflation itself. 
 
Section 1 sets out a methodology for identifying episodes of single and of multiple 
objectives. Section 2 reports the basic results from implementing that methodology, for what 
the IMF lists as ‘advanced economies’.1 Section 3 discusses those results and examines the 
economic performance associated with different types of objectives. Section 4 sets out how 
an inflation-targeting central bank’s remit could be modified to allow it to pursue other 
objectives when appropriate within an overriding price stability constraint. Section 5 
concludes. 
 
2 Methodology 
The methodology developed here shares a focus on variations in exchange rate regimes with 
the classification of Levy Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2005), who used statistical data to 
classify exchange rate regimes by individual years. It also has a focus on variations in 
monetary policy regimes, which are typically identified on the de jure basis of preannounced 
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targets (for inflation or money or other aggregates).2 The methodology developed here is 
different in that it brings together exchange rate and other potential monetary policy 
objectives in a unified comprehensive analysis. However, it does not aim to provide a 
characterisation of the monetary regime in each country at each point in time; for example, it 
does not consider pre-announced targets and it does not take into account the wider effects on 
expectations of different kinds of (pre-announced) monetary regimes.3 Instead, its focus is on 
the single objectives, if any, which the monetary authorities have in fact successfully pursued, 
whether those are domestic or external, and – by elimination – on the authorities’ pursuit of 
multiple objectives, over calendar years.  Because the concern here is with realised outcomes 
rather than intentions (or regimes), the identity of the monetary policymaker – government or 
central bank – plays no role in the classification, though the secular move from policymaking 
by governments to policymaking by independent central banks has obviously contributed to 
the changes in realised objectives and realised outcomes, notably the long-term decline in 
inflation, over the period.4 
 
 Principles 
The focus here is on the outcome rather than the intention or the means: a government or 
central bank which has seriously (and successfully) pursued a single objective must in some 
sense have controlled the relevant economic variable closely, that is within some tight limits, 
and must have controlled it more closely than any other such variable. On the other hand, a 
policymaker who declines to control any variable to that degree of precision (but may be 
stabilising more than one variable within looser limits) can be assumed to have decided that 
the costs of pursuing a single objective in terms of the effects on other possible objective 
variables is too high, that is, the policymaker is implicitly pursuing multiple objectives. To 
assess this what is needed is an approach which allows us to compare the degree of control 
4 
 
across different variables, which means that we need a common way of measuring 
performance in terms of the different variables. The principal alternative variables that 
policymakers might have tried to stabilise over the period concerned (1974-2012) are the 
growth rates of prices, real income, nominal income and money,5 on the one hand, and 
exchange rates, on the other hand. Fixed exchange rates can be represented by zero growth 
rates of exchange rates, while crawling pegs would involve non-zero growth rates.6  The 
outturn for these variables can therefore be compared in terms of the standard deviation of the 
growth rates of each of these variables. Pursuit of a single objective will be identified by (a) 
the relevant standard deviation being below those for the other possible objective variables 
and (b) the relevant standard deviation being below some absolute threshold. On the other 
hand, if these criteria are not fulfilled for any single objective, it is assumed that the monetary 
policymakers are implicitly trading off between more than one objective, that is, pursuing 
multiple objectives.  
 
The genuine pursuit of a single objective must be the result of the deliberate use for that 
purpose of the policy instrument(s), rather than the workings of chance. In investigations of 
de facto regimes Calvo and Reinhart (2000) and Levy Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2005) have 
ensured this by examining data on the use of the policy instruments (foreign exchange 
reserves, also interest rates). Complications could arise if this was done here from, for 
example, the stability of policy interest rates at the effective lower bound after 2009, or 
indeed at other important turning points, particularly given the focus on individual calendar 
years.  Hence, given that the emphasis is on the outcome rather than the means, the variability 
of possible instruments will be ignored but the criteria for identifying the objectives followed 
will be drawn sufficiently tightly to make chance attainment of an objective highly unlikely.  
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Because there are a range of alternative anchor currencies to which countries can peg, it is 
necessary to identify first which anchor, if any, a country may be pursuing before bringing 
that objective into comparison with the domestic objectives. For that reason the analysis starts 
by comparing the different possible domestic objectives – formulated as inflation, real 
income growth, nominal income growth and monetary growth – and identifying the relevant 
possible external anchors – dollar, Deutsche mark, ecu and euro – before combining the 
domestic and external results. 
 
Finally, as stated above, it is assumed that the monetary authorities could always, if they 
really wanted to, control a single objective variable (though the costs might be high), so that 
if they do not do this they are implicitly trading off between more than one objective, that is, 
pursuing multiple objectives. However, the very large category of country/year cases where 
no single objective can be identified clearly covers a wide range of monetary policy strategies 
and experiences, from the coherent and disciplined to the poorly organised and profligate. It 
therefore makes sense to distinguish between multiple objectives subject to a price stability 
constraint and multiple objectives pure and simple. This is roughly comparable to Reinhart 
and Rogoff’s (2004) distinction between freely floating and freely falling exchange rates, in 
which they use the criterion of inflation > 40% to identify the latter category and keep 
countries in that situation separate from genuine floaters with low inflation. 
 
Application 
The initial data are in nearly all cases quarterly data taken from the IMF’s International 
Financial Statistics.7 See the Data Appendix for further details. For each calendar year, data 
on the four quarters of that year, together with the last quarter of the previous year and the 
first quarter of the following year, are used to infer the type of objective pursued in that year. 
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The use of the two quarters preceding and succeeding the calendar year ensures an overlap 
which avoids sharp end-year changes going unnoticed, while standard deviations measured 
over six rather than over four quarters are less affected by individual outliers.  
 
On the domestic side, data on the percentage growth rates since four quarters before of 
consumer prices,8 real GDP, nominal GDP and broad money are used to calculate standard 
deviations of growth rates over the six quarters. These standard deviations are then used to 
identify single de facto objectives as follows: 
 
type of objective relative criteria threshold criterion 
single objective of inflation 
SP 
σπ < each of σgy, σgpy, σgm σπ < 0.5 
single objective of real 
income  growth SY 
σgy < each of σπ, σgpy, σgm σgy < 0.5 
single objective of nominal 
income growth SPY 
σgpy < each of σπ, σgy, σgm σgpy < 0.5 
single objective of monetary 
growth SM 
σgm < each of σπ, σgy, σgpy σgm < 1 
where σ indicates standard deviation, π is inflation, gy is real income growth, gpy is nominal 
income growth, and gm is monetary growth. 
 
The idea behind the relative criteria is that if the policymaker is seriously pursuing a single 
objective, he or she must be stabilising its growth more than that of any of the other variables. 
The effect of the threshold criteria for SP, SY and SPY is that (under a normal distribution) 
the growth rate of the variable must in 68% of cases be no more than 0.5 away from the mean 
(e.g. in 68% of cases inflation must be no more than 0.5% away from its mean), and it must 
in 95% of cases be no more than 1 away from the mean; this is, if anything, a little less strict 
than the rules typically involved in formal inflation targeting.9 The corresponding threshold 
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criterion for monetary growth is set at 1, on the grounds that monetary growth is inherently 
less stable (or inertial) in the short run than the growth of prices or income; even so, as will 
be shown below, relatively few cases of SM are identified. 
 
On these criteria it turns out that in many country/year cases policymakers have not been 
pursuing single objectives, from which it is inferred that de facto they have been following a 
number of different objectives, but these cases vary widely in terms of policy operation and 
performance. Given the primacy typically accorded in theoretical and policy analysis to price 
stability, the following simple distinction would seem to be appropriate: 
 
type of objective criteria 
multiple objectives subject to a price stability 
constraint MC 
no single objective threshold criteria fulfilled 
but average inflation < 5% 
multiple objectives (unconstrained) MU no single objective threshold criteria fulfilled, 
and average inflation ≥ 5% 
 
On the external side, data on exchange rates of currencies against the US dollar, the Deutsche 
mark (DM) up to the end of 1998, the ecu (data are available from 1979 Q3 to 1998 Q4) and 
the euro (from 1999) are used to generate four quarter growth rates, from which the standard 
deviations over the six quarters are calculated.10 These standard deviations are then used to 
identify single de facto exchange rate objectives as follows: 
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type of objective relative criteria threshold criteria 
single objective of exchange 
rate against dollar SUSD 
σgusd < each of σgdm, σgecu, 
σgeuro as appropriate  in 
different subperiods 
σgusd < 1 
single objective of exchange 
rate against Deutsche mark 
SDM 
σgdm < each of σgusd, σgecu as 
appropriate  in different 
subperiods 
σgdm < 1 
single objective of exchange 
rate against ecu SECU 
σgecu < each of σgusd, σgdm  σgecu < 1 
single objective of exchange 
rate against euro SEURO 
σgeuro < σgusd σgeuro < 1 
single objective of exchange 
rate against pound sterling 
SGBP 
σggbp < each of σgusd, σgdm σggbp < 1 
where gusd, gdm, gecu, geuro and ggbp represent respectively the growth rates of exchange 
rates against the dollar, the mark, the ecu, the euro and the UK pound. The final row relates 
only to Ireland, which was in a currency union with the UK up to mid-1979, so that its σggbp 
was equal to 0. 
 
The relative criteria here ensure that a government or central bank has stabilised its exchange 
rate on one anchor currency more closely than on any other. The threshold criteria require 
that 68% of the time the exchange rate growth must be no more than 1 percentage point away 
from its mean, and 95% of the time it must be no more than 2 away from the mean. This is 
less strict than the threshold criteria used for the domestic objectives other than money, but 
exchange rates are inherently more volatile than most of the domestic variables, and these 
criteria are comparable to the exchange rate bands used in the Bretton Woods system from 
late 1971 and in (the narrow band of) the European Exchange Rate Mechanism from 1979 to 
1993 (2.25% in either direction).11  The criteria here do not include policy interest rates 
(which are typically more stable than exchange rates) or foreign exchange reserves, as 
9 
 
discussed above. However, the thresholds are sufficiently strict that they identify, as will be 
shown below, rather few cases of de facto exchange rate objectives in the sample, which 
suggests that the method is unlikely to be picking up spurious examples of chance exchange 
rate stability. Cases where no de facto exchange rate objective is being pursued are labelled 
as follows: 
 
type of objective criteria 
no exchange rate objective NER no single exchange rate objective threshold 
criterion fulfilled 
 
The final step is to choose between domestic and external objectives where both have been 
identified for a particular country/year. This is done by comparing the standard deviation of 
the domestic and external objectives identified for each country/year to find the lower (and 
for this purpose the standard deviation of inflation is used for MC as well as for SP). The 
algorithm also ensures that a country/year case where there is a domestic objective of some 
kind but no external objective is classified in terms of the domestic objective, while a case 
where there is MU in terms of the domestic objective but a clear exchange rate objective is 
classified in terms of the latter. The overall default category is MU, no clear domestic or 
external objective and average inflation ≥ 5%. 
 
3 Implementation 
Table 1 shows the numbers of different domestic objectives identified initially (before the 
consolidation with external objectives) in four subperiods: the pre-Great Moderation years of 
1974-91, the pre-EMU Great Moderation subperiod 1992-98, the Great Moderation with 
EMU subperiod 1999-2007, and the (shorter) crisis subperiod.12 It should be noted that there 
are cases where no objective can be defined, because the data or the country (e.g. Slovakia 
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pre-1993), do not exist, or because no separate currency area/monetary authority exists (the 
euro area pre-1999 and its members from 1999); these cases are denoted by X. 
[Table 1 near here] 
 
The strategies for which large numbers of cases are identified are SP, MU, MC and, to a 
lesser extent, SM. There are a few cases of SY in the earlier subperiods, mainly for France, 
Portugal and Spain. There are even fewer cases of SPY, including the UK 1982 and the USA 
1999, 2004-5. There are a considerable number of cases of SM in the first two subperiods, for 
a range of countries including the US, Japan, Switzerland and some other European countries, 
but fewer thereafter. SP is identified in a range of cases in the first subperiod and in relatively 
larger numbers in the shorter second and third subperiods, for countries widely thought to be 
informal or formal inflation targeters, e.g. Germany, Switzerland, the US, Sweden, the UK, 
and the euro area. There is a small reduction in SP cases between the second and third 
subperiods due to the consolidation of the euro area countries in one policymaker, and then a 
sharp fall in the crisis subperiod. The two multiple objective strategies cover a large number 
of cases, with the relative incidence of MU declining through the subperiods and that of MC 
rising, which reflects a general rise in the priority accorded to price stability and a general 
decline in inflation over time. 
 
Table 2 shows the numbers of different exchange rate objectives identified over the same 
subperiods. Here the cases where no objective is feasible are shown by Z, which includes the 
cases of anchor countries such as Germany pre-1999 and the US as well as the X cases 
covered in Table 1. The first point to note here is that, on the criteria used and for the sample 
of advanced countries included, there are relatively few cases of single exchange rate 
objectives. The largest number is for the Deutsche mark in the decade or so before European 
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Monetary Union (when in addition some countries sometimes pegged more closely to the ecu 
than to the mark), while there are a few for the dollar in the earlier subperiods (e.g. Korea in 
some years) and rather more for the euro from 1999 (e.g. Denmark, and countries moving 
towards joining EMU). In each subperiod a large majority of cases are NER, no clear 
exchange rate objective. 
[Table 2 near here] 
 
Table 3 shows the strategies as finally identified, when the domestic and external objectives 
have been brought together and appropriate selections made. The effect of the consolidation 
is that some of the exchange rate objective cases have dropped out (that is, been replaced by a 
domestic objective), notably for pegs to the DM and the ecu in the run-up to EMU, and for 
pegs to the euro from 1999, while the occasional domestic objective has been replaced by an 
exchange rate objective (e.g. Netherlands 1987 goes from SY to SDM). At the same time the 
number of MU cases has gone down a little, mainly in the first subperiod, as countries with 
no clear domestic objective turned out to have clear external objectives, and there is a slightly 
larger decline for MC, particularly in the first subperiod.  
[Table 3 near here] 
 
Overall, the table is dominated by SP, MC and MU, with the incidence of SP (the percentage 
relative to the identified totals) increasing in the second and third subperiods but then falling 
back, while the incidence of MC increases in importance in each subperiod and that of MU 
decreases from the first to the third. More precisely, the trends in SP suggest strongly that SP 
is at least in large part a phenomenon of the Great Moderation, that is the second and third 
subperiods. On the other hand, the numbers of cases of MU and MC together as a percentage 
of the total cases (excluding the Xs) for the four subperiods are 61.9, 41.0, 46.1 and 63.8 
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respectively. These findings, that in two of the four subperiods at least 60%, and in the other 
two at least 40%, of advanced economy policymakers have been pursuing multiple objectives 
of some kind, and that a number of countries switched from SP to MC when the crisis struck, 
should be regarded, not as a failure of policymakers to understand the Tinbergen principle, 
but as a reflection of the plurality of objectives which policymakers inevitably face in a world 
where more than one dimension of economic activity is of concern to their citizens, and a 
reflection of the fact that inflation targeting has always been practised in a ‘flexible’ rather 
than ‘strict’ way (see, for example, Roger, 2010, p. 36). The shift over time from MU to MC 
could be understood as evidence of policymakers’ improving ability over time to make 
desirable trade-offs between price stability and other objectives.  
 
An alternative perspective on the time trends is given by Figure 1a, which shows the number 
of countries identified as pursuing each type of objective in each year and Figure 1b, which 
shows the percentage following each objective. The total number of countries, as already 
indicated, varies as data becomes available (Czech Republic, Slovakia and Slovenia), when 
the start of EMU concentrates a large number of countries in a single currency area with a 
single monetary regime, and when additional countries join EMU. Between them, the figures 
make clear, first, that the number of these countries pursuing exchange rate objectives is few, 
throughout. Second, they show that the two multiple objectives categories occupy a very 
large space between them, but the unconstrained MU declines over time in favour of MC. 
Third, they show that the SP category was well-frequented in the Great Moderation years 
(second and third subperiod), but at the point of the crisis many countries abandoned SP, 
though some came back to it in the later years. Finally, the figures make clear that while SM 
had its adherents at various times they were never that many, and the followers of SPY and 
SY were even fewer.13 
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[Figures 1a, 1b near here] 
 
The full set of identifications of strategies is shown in Appendix Table A1. A few specific 
country examples can be discussed. First, Germany has several years of SP and of MC in the 
first subperiod, together with odd years of MU and SM. In the second subperiod and up to 
1998 it is mainly MC or SP, but in 1992, the year of the ERM crisis, it is MU. The main 
reason for these variations is the variations in the degree of inflation control. Germany was, 
of course, not a formal inflation targeter but Bernanke and Mihov (1997) argued that it was 
de facto targeting inflation over much of the period 1975-96. The US, on the other hand, is 
mainly MU or SM in the first subperiod, but has more years of SP in the second and is mainly 
either SP or MC (plus several years of SPY or SY) from 1990 until the crisis, when it 
becomes mainly MC; these fluctuations reflect variations in the control of inflation but also 
of the other domestic objective variables. The prevalence of SP is consistent with the typical 
characterisation of the US from the mid-1990s as an informal inflation targeter (see also 
Goodfriend, 2002). For the UK the first subperiod is mainly MU, with three years of MC, two 
of SP and one of SPY,14 while the second subperiod is mainly SP, with two MU and one MC 
over 1990-92, the ERM period;15 from 1997 to 2007 the UK is identified as SP, but from 
2008 it has three years of MC followed by two of SY. This is clearly consistent with the 
conventional view of the Bank of England as a serious inflation targeter in the pre-crisis 
Great Moderation period. Finally, the European Central Bank is SP from 1999 to 2006, 
followed by four years of MC, then from 2011 it reverts to SP. Again, this is broadly 
consistent with received views of the ECB as an informal inflation targeter before the crisis. 
As already indicated, these central banks’ shifts of attention from inflation to other objectives 
in the immediate crisis years can be regarded as sensible responses to the exceptional 
weakness of real economic activity at this point.  
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4 Performance under different de facto objectives 
Table 4 shows the (unconditional) inflation performance associated with each type of 
objective. Average performance, from the total row at the bottom of the table, improved 
significantly from the first to the second and then again to the third subperiod. Performance 
under SP followed a similar trajectory from a lower starting-point, and performance in the 
third subperiod was what would be regarded as highly satisfactory at 1.8%. In the final 
subperiod, performance was 1.7% but there were only 17 cases of SP. Inflation under SDM in 
the first two subperiods was a little lower than that under SP, while performance under 
SEURO in the last two subperiods was less good, with inflation closer to 3%. Performance 
under other exchange rate objectives was less satisfactory, on small numbers of cases, while 
performance under SPY and SY was poor in the first subperiod but (particularly for SPY) 
rather better later, again on a small number of cases. Performance under MU improved 
between the first and second and between the second and third subperiods, but at 7.3% in the 
third and 7.6% in the fourth it remained clearly unsatisfactory. Performance under MC, on 
the other hand, was only 2.8% in the first subperiod, the lowest for any objective, the same 
and a little less than under SP in the second, but slightly more than under SP in the third and 
in the final, crisis, period. 
[Table 4 near here] 
 
Table 5 presents comparable data for the real growth performance under each objective. 
Overall, there is much less variation here, as might be expected, except for the much lower 
rate in the fourth subperiod. Performance under the exchange rate objectives is mixed. As 
between MU and MC, growth under MC is higher or the same in all except the second 
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subperiod; it is also higher than under SP in the first and third but rather lower in the fourth 
subperiod. 
[Table 5 near here] 
Overall, on  these two measures of unconditional performance together, it is clear that MC 
does roughly as well as SP, while SP and MC both do a great deal better than MU on 
inflation, though not, except in the crisis period, on growth. These are the findings of an 
unconditional analysis, that is, they do not control for variables such as openness (which 
might affect inflation) or the investment to GDP ratio (which might affect growth). Tables 6 
and 7 present the results of conditional analyses, where inflation and growth performance are 
regressed on the various objectives together with a range of more or less standard control 
variables.16 The interest is in the coefficients on the objective types, rather than trying to 
provide a complete explanation of inflation or growth. 
 
Table 6 presents the results of regressions of inflation on all the objective types, except for 
MU which is the default, together with three standard control variables – growth, openness 
and monetary growth – and time dummies. There is a case in principle for using central bank 
independence (CBI), but statute-based measures of CBI on a consistent basis covering this 
period are available only for the late 1980s and end-2003 in Laurens, Arnone and Segalotto 
(2009), so that there are only two values for each country; and if this measure is used CBI is 
almost always insignificant. Consistent data on fiscal deficits are available, in the form of the 
general government financial balance as % of GDP, only for the latter part of the period, but 
they are used as additional variables for the last two subperiods.  
[Table 6 near here] 
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Regression 1 is a pooled OLS regression for the whole period. Six of the objective 
coefficients are significantly negative at the 1% or 5% level, which indicates that these 
objectives are typically associated with lower inflation than that under unconstrained multiple 
objectives. These six include two single exchange rate objectives – SECU and SDM in 
descending order of the (absolute) coefficients – and four domestic objectives – MC, SP, SY 
and SM. Regression 2 adds country fixed effects (as well as the year dummies already 
included in regression 1). Five of the objectives are now significant – SECU (now significant 
only at the 10% level), MC, SDM, SP and SM. Because the second and fourth subperiods are 
rather short, with 7 and 5 years respectively, it makes sense to estimate each of these in 
conjunction with the succeeding or preceding subperiod.  Regressions 3, 4, 5 and 7 repeat the 
fixed effects exercise of regression 2. Regression 3 covers the long first subperiod (pre-Great 
Moderation), regression 4 covers the second and third together (the whole of the Great 
Moderation), regression 5 covers the third (post-EMU Great Moderation) and regression 7 
covers the third plus fourth (crisis) subperiods. There are some large and significant values 
for the coefficients of objectives with low frequency, notably SPY, SY, SECU, SEURO and 
SM, in the later subperiods, but the interesting results are those for the two objectives (other 
than the default category, MU) with high frequency. MC and SP are significant at the 1% or 
5% level in each case. The coefficient on the former is always absolutely larger than that on 
the latter, but never significantly so. Regressions 6 and 8 include the general government 
financial balance as an additional control variable; there are only small differences between 
regressions 5 and 6, or between 7 and 8; however the relationship between the MC and SP 
coefficients is unchanged. 
 
The regressions in table 7 provide the results of comparable pooled OLS and fixed effects 
regressions for real per capita GDP growth, using as control variables openness, the 
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investment ratio, population, population growth, average years of schooling and, where 
possible, the general government financial balance. Regressions 1 and 2 give pooled OLS and 
fixed effects results for the whole period. Here rather fewer objective types are significant, 
but MC and SP are significantly positive at the 1% level in both cases, which indicates that 
they are associated with higher growth than that under MU; in the fixed effects but not in the 
OLS regression the coefficient on SP is greater than that on MC but not significantly so. In 
regression 3 for the 1974-91 subperiod the only significant objective is SPY, and in 
regression 4 for the 1992-07 subperiod the coefficient on SP is larger (and significant at the 
5% level) than that on MC (significant only at the 10% level). For the 1999-2007 subperiod 
(regression 5) MC is significantly positive at the 10% level while SP is not significant (and 
has a smaller coefficient). When the general government financial balance is added in 
regression 6 MC is significant at the 5% level but SP remains insignificant. In regression 7 
for the third and fourth subperiods together, both MC and SP are significant at the 5% level, 
with the MC coefficient slightly higher than that on SP; this pattern remains when the general 
government financial balance is added in regression 8.17  
[Table 7 near here] 
 
What comes out of this conditional analysis is therefore broadly in line with the results of the 
unconditional analysis: MC and SP are associated with much better performance than MU; 
MC is associated consistently with slightly lower inflation than SP, while the evidence on 
growth is mixed: there are fewer cases overall of significant objectives and MC is sometimes 
associated with higher growth than SP, but sometimes with lower growth. The inflation 
results here could be compared with those in the inflation targeting literature, though it is 
important to emphasise that that literature uses de jure identification of inflation targeters and 
covers regimes rather than (separately classified) individual country/year cases. Most authors 
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in that literature have found significant downward effects on inflation from inflation 
targeting, e.g. Schmidt-Hebbel (2010, section 5.5). However, Ball (2010, abstract) found, 
when he controlled for the initial level of performance, ‘little evidence that inflation targeting 
affects performance in advanced economies’, and raised doubts about many of the 
econometric techniques used. The results here are closer to Ball’s results, though the 
qualifications above mean that strict comparisons are inappropriate.  
 
 
4 A multiple objectives remit for a central bank 
In section 2 it was shown that many advanced country monetary policymakers have in fact 
pursued multiple objectives for much of the period since the end of the Bretton Woods 
international monetary system. Over that period there has also been a shift from multiple 
objectives unconstrained, MU, to multiple objectives subject to a price stability constraint, 
MC.  In section 3 it was shown that the economic performance associated with MC (but not 
that associated with MU) is broadly comparable to that associated with SP. Given the failure 
of major central banks to address the issue of rising house prices in the run-up to the crisis in 
2007,18 this suggests that it would be useful for central banks to monitor and stand ready to 
respond to other objectives in addition to inflation. Informal inflation targeters such as the 
Federal Reserve Board (pre-2012) and the ECB can just do this. But how can the remit of a 
formally inflation-targeting central bank be revised to facilitate this without losing the 
advantages of accountability and transparency widely thought to be conferred by formal 
inflation targeting (see, for example, Schmidt-Hebbel, 2010)? 
 
First, the central bank’s remit should continue to accord priority to price stability, but it 
should allow the central bank to respond to other issues including, for example, house price 
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bubbles, exchange rate misalignments (though this is clearly more problematic) and 
exceptional weaknesses in real economic activity, if the policymakers see fit to do so.  
 
Secondly, however, the remit should require such responses to be publicly announced. Here, 
it would be useful to adapt one of the provisions of the BoE’s current remit. That remit 
requires the Governor, in the event of a deviation of the inflation rate from the formal target 
by more than one percentage point in either direction, to write an open letter to the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer (minister of finance) saying why he/she thinks this has 
happened, what the Monetary Policy Committee is doing about it, and how long it thinks the 
deviation will last. 
 
A revised remit could specify a primary and long-term target for inflation, from which the 
central bank can deviate in case of significant real economy weakness or threats to financial 
stability which it cannot be sure that it can control by using the new macro-prudential tools 
being introduced; but if it does so the Governor must write an open letter to the Minister of 
Finance specifying what the central bank is doing and why, how long it expects to be giving 
priority to the non-inflation objective, and how it foresees a return to normal operations. Such 
an arrangement would allow the central bank to take a wider view of its responsibilities but in 
a context of transparency and accountability which would avoid danger to its anti-inflationary 
credibility, on the one hand, and prevent ‘political’ or otherwise inappropriate policy 
decisions, on the other. Crucially, from the point of the ‘monetary policy and asset prices’ 
debate, this remit would convey to the financial markets and the private sector that the central 
bank will ultimately use interest rates to limit asset price bubbles if no other instruments are 
available and successful, and this should provide a ceiling to house price inflation 
expectations of the kind that did not exist in the mid-2000s. 
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5 Concluding comments 
This paper has introduced a methodology to identify when policymakers (governments or 
central banks) have genuinely pursued single objectives of different kinds, that is, when 
policymakers have succeeded in stabilising a single variable within narrow margins. When 
policymakers are not stabilising any single variable to that degree, although they may be 
stabilising several variables to a lesser extent, they are treated as pursuing, that is trading off 
between, more than one objective. This methodology produces plausible individual country 
identifications and overall trends. It suggests that the pursuit of multiple objectives has been 
common in ‘advanced’ countries. However, the multiple objectives category covers a 
multitude of sins, so that it is appropriate to make a simple division between multiple 
objectives pure and simple, MU, and multiple objectives subject to a price stability constraint, 
MC.  
 
Conditional and unconditional analysis of the inflation and growth performance associated 
with different de facto objectives revealed that MC  – defined in a relatively generous way as 
inflation < 5% – is associated with inflation and growth at very comparable levels to SP 
(single objective of inflation), which suggests that giving up the single-minded pursuit of 
inflation in favour of wider objectives does not have to involve a serious cost in economic 
performance. 
 
Finally, the paper has presented a proposed adjustment to the remit of a formally inflation-
targeting central bank which would allow the benefits of inflation targeting to be preserved, 
but enable the central bank to respond when appropriate to exceptional weakness in economic 
activity or to otherwise uncontrollable asset price movements. 
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Notes
 
1 Estonia and Hong Kong have been excluded, the former on the grounds that it has come into 
the IMF’s ‘advanced’ category only since it adopted the euro, and probably for that reason; 
the latter on the grounds that it is a different sort of economy subject to a variety of unusual 
constraints (and operating a currency board against the USD since 1983). 
2 It is such preannounced targets that underlie the classification behind Figure 4.1 in Roger 
(2010), for example, or the identification of inflation targeters in the many studies of the 
effectiveness of inflation targeting, surveyed, for example, by Ball (2010). 
3 The main alternative classification of exchange rate regimes, that of Reinhart and Rogoff 
(2004), uses both preannouncements and realised data, typically for windows of five years, 
and therefore provides a classification of exchange rate regimes in the more common sense of 
that word. 
4 For changes to central bank statutes over the period see Laurens, Arnone and Segalotto 
(2009), and for a more detailed study of three countries see Cobham, Cosci and Mattesini 
(2008). 
5 It seems highly unlikely that any government or central bank focused more than 
occasionally on any asset prices other than exchange rates over the period concerned.    
6 Levy Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2005) use both the mean and the standard deviation of the 
monthly percentage changes of the exchange rate, as a way of distinguishing between 
crawling as well as fixed pegs, but in the present exercise it is not necessary to make such a 
distinction. 
7 Quarterly data is used because higher frequency data are not available for real or nominal 
GDP. For country/year cases where quarterly data for GDP are not available (a number of 
European countries, mainly in the 1970s and 1980s) it is assumed that the policymakers could 
not have been trying to stabilise real or nominal income growth because of the lack of data. 
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8 Data for consumer prices from IFS are used; these are internationally comparable, and avoid 
the need to gather information about the specific indices which individual countries use for 
their formal or inflation targets. 
9 For example, the Bank of England has a point target, but special significance is attached to 
deviations of more than 1% from that target. Of the nine ‘advanced’ countries whose 
inflation-targeting details are given in Hammond (2012), four (Iceland, Norway, Sweden and 
UK) had point targets, while five (Australia, Canada, Israel, New Zealand and Korea) had 
target ranges (a range of 1% for Australia and 2% for the others). 
10 At start- or end-points for different anchor currencies, e.g. the replacement of the DM by 
the euro at the start of 1999, the standard deviations are calculated over five rather than six 
quarters. 
11 Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) use 2% as their threshold for distinguishing between, for 
example, preannounced horizontal bands and preannounced crawling pegs. 
12 The full country/year classification is given in Appendix Table A1. 
13 It is also worth noting that SY and SPY were never maintained for more than two years in 
a row, while SM was sometimes followed for four or five years (US, 1978-82; Japan 1985-
88). 
14 The UK had formal monetary targets for much of this period, but it often missed them; the 
threshold criterion for SM was attained only for 1984, when the criterion for SP was attained 
by a wider margin. 
15 The UK was only committed to the wider 6% band within the ERM, but neither during this 
period nor during the DM-shadowing episode of 1987-88 was the UK anywhere near being 
classified as having a single exchange rate objective (against DM or ecu). 
16 The variables used here are broadly those which are significant in Husain, Mody and 
Rogoff’s (2005) estimations of the relationships between their de facto exchange rate regimes 
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and inflation and growth, for advanced economies with fixed effects. Their variables (and 
their data) were those used by Ghosh, Gulde and Wolf (2002).  
17 SY is in some cases but not in others associated with better growth performance. But it 
should be emphasised that the identification of SY is about the stabilisation of the real (total, 
not per capita) GDP growth rate, rather than its maximisation. 
18 See Cobham (2013) for an analysis of the behaviour of the Federal Reserve Board and the 
Bank of England over these years, which finds that (in different ways) these central banks did 
not allocate enough attention to the issue and can be argued to have failed to do everything 
they might have done to avert or mitigate the crisis. 
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Table 1: Domestic objectives by subperiod, pre-consolidation 
 
 1974-91 1992-98 1999-2007 2008-2012 
SP 79 94 68 17 
SY 12 5 9 3 
SPY 3 3 4 0 
SM 59 14 7 7 
MC 91 59 77 46 
MU 260 37 13 7 
X 72 12 110 80 
Total 576 224 288 160 
X is the number of cases where data was not available (e.g. Slovenia pre-1993) or no separate 
strategy was in place (e.g. ECB pre-1999, euro area countries from 1999). 
 
 
Table 2: Exchange rate objectives by subperiod, pre-consolidation 
 
 1974-91 1992-98 1999-2007 2008-2012 
SUSD 7 1 0 0 
SDM 49 37 0 0 
SECU 13 10 0 0 
SEURO 0 0 23 5 
SGBP 5 0 0 0 
NER 394 150 140 66 
Z 108 26 125 89 
Total 576 224 288 160 
Z is the number of cases where data was not available (e.g. Slovenia pre-1993) or no separate 
strategy was feasible (e.g. euro area countries from 1999) or the country concerned was itself 
an anchor (US, Germany pre-1999, ECB from 1999). 
 
 
Table 3: Objectives as finally identified, by subperiod 
 
 1974-91 1992-98 1999-2007 2008-12 
 number % number % number % number % 
SP 73 14.5 84 39.6 67 37.6 17 21.3 
SY 11 2.2 5 2.4 9 5.1 3 3.8 
SPY 2 0.4 3 1.4 4 2.2 0 0.0 
SM 54 10.7 13 6.1 7 3.9 7 8.8 
MC 68 13.5 51 24.1 69 38.8 44 55.0 
SUSD 6 1.2 1 0.5 0 0.0 0 0.0 
SDM 33 6.5 14 6.6 0 0.0 0 0.0 
SECU 8 1.6 5 2.4 0 0.0 0 0.0 
SEURO 0 0.0 0 0.0 9 5.1 2 2.5 
SGBP 5 1.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 
MU 244 48.4 36 17.0 13 7.3 7 8.8 
X 72  12  110  80  
Total 576  224  288  160  
Percentages are relative to the total of non-X cases. 
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Table 4: Average inflation performance by objective, by subperiod 
 
 1974-91 1992-98 1999-2007 2008-12 
SP 5.1 2.3 1.9 1.7 
SY 8.7 1.8 3.8 3.4 
SPY 6.0 2.1 2.2  
SM 8.0 3.0 1.2 1.2 
MC 2.4 2.4 2.2 2.4 
SUSD 12.9 4.8   
SDM 3.6 2.1   
SECU 4.2 4.9   
SEURO   2.6 2.9 
SGBP 15.4    
MU 19.5 9.7 7.1 7.6 
Total 12.2 3.7 2.5 2.6 
Note: the total is a weighted average (excluding X cases) where the weights correspond to the 
relative incidence of each type of objective.. 
 
 
Table 5: Average real income growth performance by objective, by subperiod 
 
 1974-91 1992-98 1999-2007 2008-12 
SP 3.6 3.6 3.1 2.1 
SY 2.7 3.5 3.5 1.2 
SPY 2.9 4.4 4.0  
SM 3.4 3.0 2.4 0.2 
MC 4.5 3.2 4.3 1.0 
SUSD 6.8 6.1   
SDM 3.1 2.5   
SECU 3.3 2.7   
SEURO   3.0 -0.6 
SGBP 4.6    
MU 3.2 3.6 3.9 0.4 
Total 3.5 3.4 3.6 1.1 
Note: the total is a weighted average (excluding X cases). 
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Table 6: Inflation regressions 
 1 2 3 4 5  6 7 8 
 1974-2012 1974-2012 1974-91 1992-2007 1999-2007 1999-2007 1999-2012 1999-2012 
 OLS Fixed effects Fixed effects Fixed effects Fixed effects Fixed effects Fixed effects Fixed effects 
constant 13.31 (2.57)*** 3.77 (3.26) 9.95 (5.14) 5.59 (1.55)*** 4.21 (1.05)*** 5.97 (1.57)*** 5.00 (1.13)*** 4.74 (1.52)*** 
growth -0.34 (0.15)** 0.57 (0.19)*** -0.51 (0.26)* -0.17 (0.07)** -0.26 (0.07)*** -0.26 (0.07)*** -0.15 (0.09)* -0.16 (0.08)* 
openness -0.00 (0.07) 0.12 (0.04)*** 0.05 (0.06) 0.01 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) -0.01 (0.02) 0.00 (0.01) 0.00 (0.02) 
monet growth 0.38 (0.01)*** 0.33 (0.18)* 0.28 (0.19) 0.13 (0.07)* 0.03 (0.02)** 0.03 (0.02)* 0.01 (0.02) 0.02 (0.02) 
gen govt fin bal      -0.07 (0.05)  -0.13 (0.06)* 
MC -7.31 (1.13)*** -3.91 (0.93)*** -3.78 (1.11)*** -3.53 (0.68)*** -2.85 (0.53)*** -2.71 (0.54)*** -3.14 (0.45)*** -3.03 (0.46)*** 
SDM -7.41 (2.15)*** -2.71 (1.15)** -3.17 (1.39)** -3.16 (0.73)***     
SECU -7.70 (3.79)** -4.41 (2.26)* -5.25 (3.63) -2.74 (0.74)***     
SEURO -6.55 (4.16) -0.53 (1.40)  -2.79 (0.78)*** -2.53 (0.65)*** -2.58 (0.77)*** -2.80 (0.60)*** -2.90 (0.52)*** 
SGBP 0.48 (5.89) 3.76 (2.49) 1.92 (2.70)      
SP -6.58 (1.30)*** -2.30 (0.82)*** -2.67 (1.12)** -3.08 (0.69)*** -2.61 (0.60)*** -2.39 (0.63)*** -2.93 (0.55)*** -2.63 (0.56)*** 
SM -5.54 (1.67)*** -2.22 (0.91)** -1.70 (1.24) -2.59 (0.82)*** -2.72 (0.65)*** -2.54 (0.66)*** -3.20 (0.47)*** -2.83 (0.51)*** 
SPY -6.58 (4.48) -2.52 (1.72) -6.35 (3.92) -2.69 (0.95)*** -1.92 (0.66)*** -1.54 (0.69)** -2.05 (0.67)*** -1.68 (0.73)** 
SY -5.63 (2.68)** -1.82 (1.36) -3.33 (2.58) -3.01 (0.74)*** -2.07 (0.69)*** -1.79 (0.71)** -2.14 (0.90)** -1.89 (0.88)** 
SUSD -6.09 (5.01) -3.54 (2.00) -2.86 (2.60) -3.64 (0.59)***     
observations 961 961 500 386 177 152 252 222 
R-squared 0.54 0.50 0.38 0.57 0.51 0.59 0.49 0.54 
Notes: robust standard errors (clustered on country) in brackets; ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively; R-squared 
is adjusted for OLS, within for fixed effects. 
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Table 7: Growth regressions 
 1 2 3 4 5  6 7 8 
 1974-2012 1974-2012 1974-91 1992-2007 1999-2007 1999-2007 1999-2012 1999-2012 
 OLS Fixed effects Fixed effects Fixed effects Fixed effects Fixed effects Fixed effects Fixed effects 
constant -0.92 (0.81) 1.73 (5.25) -0.57 (11.41) 17.48 (13.08) 16.84 (17.81) -13.83 (25.46) -18.23 (18.78) -8.04 (29.83) 
openness 0.01 (0.00)*** 0.04 (0.01)*** 0.08 (0.02)*** 0.07 (0.01)*** 0.11 (0.02)*** 0.13 (0.03)*** 0.04 (0.02)** 0.03 (0.03) 
investratio 0.14 (0.02)*** 0.10 (0.04)** 0.01 (0.07) 0.20 (0.07)*** 0.15 (0.07)* 0.02 (0.10) 0.18 (0.11) 0.08 (0.08) 
populn -0.11(0.05)* -0.26 (2.35) -3.06 (4.77) -12.21 (3.88)*** -15.19 (8.59)* 0.02 (10.15) 3.60 (7.13) 2.58 (9.13) 
pop grow -0.24 (0.12)** -0.54 (0.25)** -0.48 (0.46) -1.06 (0.17)*** -1.11 (0.25)*** 0.09 (0.69) -1.02 (0.40)** 0.10 (0.46) 
schooling -0.08 (0.05) -0.56 (0.22)** 0.46 (0.76) 0.04 (0.50) 0.68 (0.45) 0.54 (0.46) 0.41 (0.87) -0.11 (1.07) 
g g fin bal      0.17 (0.06)**  0.16 (0.06)** 
MC 0.78 (0.25)*** 0.96 (0.29)*** 0.66 (0.48) 1.01 (0.57)* 1.34 (0.68)* 1.65 (0.67)** 1.73 (0.62)** 1.87 (0.64)*** 
SM 0.20 (0.41) 0.99 (0.45)** 0.50 (0.51) 1.59 (0.63)**     
SECU 1.05 (0.74) 1.13 (0.60)* 0.92 (0.84) 0.35 (0.75)     
SEURO 0.09 (0.79) -0.34 (0.55)  0.62 (1.02) -0.45 (0.75) 0.22 (0.62) 1.19 (0.85) 1.19 (0.66)* 
SP 0.69 (0.25)*** 1.11 (0.33)*** 0.43 (0.36) 1.43 (0.55)** 0.94 (0.76) 1.16 (0.71) 1.61 (0.75)** 1.75 (0.73)** 
SM 0.33 (0.32) 0.41 (0.34) 0.14 (0.41) 1.02 (0.66) 0.87 (1.07) 1.03 (0.99) 1.41 (0.81)* 1.40 (0.78)* 
SPY 1.69 (0.84)** 1.93 (0.40)*** 2.57 (0.34)*** 2.14 (0.67)*** 1.84 (0.63)*** 2.00 (0.58)*** 2.09 (0.65)*** 2.18 (0.63)*** 
SY 0.49 (0.51) 0.53 (0.31)* 0.10 (0.53) 1.13 (0.49)** 0.68 (0.60) 1.23 (0.54)** 0.70 (0.60) 1.23 (0.64)* 
SUSD 2.12 (0.95)** 0.51 (1.90) -0.71 (2.14) 3.23 (0.65)***     
obs. 940 940 471 389 181 154 261 229 
R-squared 0.32 0.34 0.28 0.39 0.53 0.55 0.58 0.64 
Notes: robust standard errors (clustered on country) in brackets; ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively; R-squared 
is adjusted for OLS, within for fixed effects. 
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Appendix Table A1: full identification of strategies 
 
COUNTRY 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992
Euro Area X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
Austria SM MU SP MU SDM MC SDM SP SDM SDM SDM SDM SDM SDM SP SP SP SP SP
Belgium MU MU SM MU SDM SDM MU SP MU MU MU SECU SDM SP SDM SDM SP SECU SP
Cyprus MU MC MC MU MU MU MU MU SM SP MU MU SM SM MC MC MC MU SM
Finland MU MU MU MU MU MU SM SM MU SP SDM MU MC SP MC MU MU MC SP
France MU MU SP SP SP SM MU MU SM SY SY SECU SY SP SP SP SP SP SDM
Germany SP SP MC SP SP MC SP MU MU SM SP MC MC MC SM SP SP MC MU
Greece SUSD MU MU MU MU MU MU MU MU MU MU MU MU MU MU MU SDM MU MU
Ireland SGBP SGBP SGBP SGBP SGBP MU MU MU MU MU MU SECU MC SP MC MC SDM SDM MC
Italy MU MU MU SM SM MU MU MU MU MU MU MU SY SP SP SY SP SP MU
Lux MU SP SM MU SDM SDM MU MU MU MU MU MC SDM SDM SDM SDM SP SECU SDM
Malta MU MU MC MU MC MU MU MU SM SM MC MC MC SM SM MC SM MC MC
Netherlands SM MU MU MU MC SDM MU SP SM SDM SECU SDM SDM SDM SDM SDM SDM SDM SDM
Portugal MU MU MU MU MU MU MU MU SY MU MU MU SDM MU MU MU MU MU MU
Slovak Republic X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
Slovenia X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
Spain MU SM SM SM MU MU SM SP MU SY SY MU MU MU MC SM SP SP MU
Australia MU MU MU MU MU SM MU MU MU SM SM MU MU MU SP MU MU MC SP
Canada MU MU MU MU SP SY MU MU MU SM SY SP SP SP SP SP MC MU MC
Czech Republic X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
Denmark MU MU MU MU MU MU MU MU SM MU SP MC MC MC SP MC MC SP SP
Iceland MU MU MU MU MU MU MU MU MU MU MU MU MU MU MU MU MU MU MC
Israel MU MU MU MU MU MU MU MU MU MU MU MU MU MU MU MU MU SM MU
Japan MU MU SP MU SM MC MU SM MC SP SP SP SM SM SM SM MC MC MC
Korea, Republic of MU MU SUSD SUSD SUSD MU MU SM SUSD MC SP SP MC MC MU SP MU MU MU
New Zealand MU MU MU MU MU MU MU SP MU MU MU MU MU MU MU MU MU MC SP
Norway SM MU MU SP MU MC SM SM MU SM MU SP MU MU MU MC SP SECU SP
Singapore MU MC MC MC MC MC MU MU MC MC MC MC MC MC SP SUSD SP MC SP
Sweden MU MU MU MU MU MU MU MU MU SP SP MU SECU MC MU MU MU MU MC
Switzerland MU MU SM SP SP SM MC MU MU SM MC SPY MC MC SP SM MU MU SM
United Kingdom MU MU MU MU MU MU MU MU SPY MC SP MU MC SP MC SP MU MU MC
United States MU MU SM MU SM SM SM SM SM MC SP SP MC MC SY SP MU SM SP
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COUNTRY 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Euro Area X X X X X X SM SP SP SP SP SP SP SP MC MC MC MC SP SP
Austria SDM SDM SP SDM SDM SDM X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
Belgium SP SP SP SDM SDM SDM X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
Cyprus SECU MC MC SM SM SECU SEURO SEURO SEURO SEURO SEURO MC SY SY X X X X X X
Finland MC MC MC SP MC SP X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
France SP SP SP SY SP SP X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
Germany MC MC SP SP SP MC X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
Greece MU SECU MU MU MU MC MC MC X X X X X X X X X X X X
Ireland SP SP SP SP SP MC X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
Italy SP SP MU MC SP SP X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
Lux SP MC SP SP SP SDM X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
Malta SM MC MC SP SP SM MC MC MC MC MC SP SP SEURO X X X X X X
NetherlandsSDM SP SDM SP SP SM X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
Portugal MU MU SECU SP SY SPY X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
Slovak Repu X MU SM MU MU MU MU MU MU MC MU MU MC MC MC X X X X X
Slovenia MU MU MU MU MU MU MU SP SY SY MU MC SP X X X X X X X
Spain SP SP SP MC MC SP X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
Australia SPY MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC SP SP SP SY MC MC MC MC SY MC MC
Canada SP MC SM SP SPY SP SM SP MC SM MC SP SP SP SP MC MC MC SP MC
Czech RepubX SP MU MU MU MU MC SY MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MU MC MC MC MC
Denmark SP SP SP SP SP SP MC SP SP SP SEURO SP SP SEURO SEURO SEURO MC SP SP SEURO
Iceland MC MC MC SP SP SP MC MU MU SM SP MC SP MU MU MU MU MU MC MU
Israel MU MU MU MU MU MU MU MC MC MU MC MC MC MC MC MC SP MC MC SP
Japan SP SM SM SM MC SM SP SP SM SM SP SP SM SP SP SM SM SM SP SP
Korea, Repu  SUSD MU MC SP MC MU MC MC MC MC SP SP MC SP SY MC MC SP SP SM
New ZealandSP MC MC SP MC MC MC MC MC SP SP MC SP MC MC SM MC MC MC SP
Norway SP MC SECU MC SP SP SP SP MC MC MC MC SP SP MC MC MC MC SP SP
Singapore SP SP MC SP SP MC MC MC MC SP SP MC MC SP MC MU SM MC MU MC
Sweden MC MC SP MC MC SY MC SP MC SP MC SP SP SP MC MC MC MC MC MC
Switzerland MC MC MC SP SP SP MC SP SP SP SP SP SP SY SPY SM MC SP MC SP
United KingdSP SP SP SY SP SP SP SP SP SP SP SP SP SP SP MC MC MC SY SY
United StateSP SP SP SP SY SP SPY SP MC MC SP SPY SPY MC SY MC MC SP MC MC
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Data Appendix 
variable definition source 
Identification of objectives 
exchange rates four quarter percentage growth rates of end of quarter official 
or market rates 
taken directly (for USD and ecu rates) or calculated 
from International Financial Statistics (IMF) 
inflation four quarter percentage growth of consumer prices IFS 
money four quarter percentage growth of broad money IFS, supplemented in small number of cases by data 
from central bank websites 
nominal income four quarter percentage growth of nominal GDP IFS 
real income four quarter percentage growth of real GDP IFS 
Regression variables 
inflation as above, averaged over four quarters of calendar year  
real per capita gdp 
growth  
GDP per capita growth, annual data WDB  
trade openness (exports plus imports)/nominal GDP IFS 
general government 
financial balance  
general government financial balance as % of GDP OECD Economic Outlook, December 2013 
investment ratio gross fixed capital formation as percentage of GDP IFS 
average schooling average years of schooling (population of 25 years and over) updated Barro-Lee dataset at www.barrolee.com 
population log of population IFS 
population growth population growth, annual % WDB 
Notes: IFS = International Financial Statistics  (IMF); WDB = World DataBank (World Bank). 
